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The Borders of Collective
Representation: Comparing the Rights
of Undocumented Workers to
Organize Under United States and
International Labor Standards
By CHRISTOPHER DAVID RUIZ CAMERON*
Introduction
IN THE UNITED STATES, THE BORDERS limiting a broad spec-
trum of workers’ rights are established by the answer to a deceptively
simple question: who counts as an “employee”?1 An “employee” has
recourse to the machinery of the legal system if she is denied the mini-
mum wage;2 equal treatment based on age,3 race, color, religion, or
sex;4 and the right to organize a union.5 A non-“employee” has no
* Irving R. Buchalter Professor of Law 2009–2010, Southwestern Law School, Los
Angeles, California. Earlier versions of this Article were presented to the Joint Annual
Meetings of the Law and Society Association and the Canadian Law and Society
Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, in June 2008, and to the University of San
Francisco School of Law’s Symposium on the Evolving Definition of the Immigrant
Worker: The Intersection Between Employment, Labor, and Human Rights Law, San
Francisco, California, in February 2009. Valuable research assistance was provided by Gary
Dennis (J.D. Class of 2010) and Anasheh Akopian (J.D. Class of 2010) of Southwestern Law
School. Insightful commentary, constructive encouragement, or both, was offered by Kevin
Johnson, Jim Pope, Maria Ontiveros, Judy Fudge, Ron McCallum, Richard Mitchell, and
Nick Connon, and by members of The Labor Law Group—especially Ken Dau-Schmidt,
Marty Malin, Roberto Corrada, and Catherine Fisk—who helped me conceive and draft a
chapter for our textbook discussing some of the issues raised herein. Any remaining errors
are mine alone.
1. See KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT, MARTIN H. MALIN, ROBERTO L. CORRADA, CHRISTO-
PHER DAVID RUIZ CAMERON & CATHERINE L. FISK, LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORK-
PLACE (2009).
2. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2006).
3. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 11(f), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621,
630(f) (2006).
4. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 701(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3, 2000e(f)
(2006).
5. See National Labor Relations Act, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(3) (2006) [herein-
after NLRA].
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legal recourse. Whereas the former is recognized as a person with
standing to invoke the protection of the law, the latter is not recog-
nized at all. She is a nobody. And like all nobodies, she is left to fend
for herself.
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is the basic law in
the United States guaranteeing the right of working people to organ-
ize unions. Under the NLRA, there are at least two methods by which
a worker can be excluded from the definition of “employee.” The first
is by statute; for sound or unsound policy reasons, the legislature may
allow some workers to play the game while requiring others to sit on
the bench. The second is by interpretation; either the administrative
agency, or the courts charged with applying the statute in question,
can choose to include certain workers within the definition of “em-
ployee” but exclude others.
An important example of the interpretation method of exclusion
is found in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB (“Hoffman Plas-
tics”),6 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002. In Hoffman Plas-
tics, an undocumented worker named Jose Castro was fired in
retaliation for distributing union authorization cards. Although this
act of retaliation was an undisputed violation of section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA,7 the Court found Castro was not entitled to collect back pay.
Back pay is a standard item on the menu of make-whole remedies
typically served up by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)
in retaliation cases. According to the majority,8 however, awarding
back pay would subvert or trivialize federal immigration policy by re-
warding an undocumented laborer for violating the extensive “em-
ployment verification system” codified by the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (“IRCA”).9
As a result, Hoffman Plastics effectively, if not in so many words,
excluded the undocumented worker from the statutory definition of
“employee” under the NLRA.
The purpose of this Article is not to beat the Hoffman Plastics deci-
sion like some pin˜ata; the overwhelming weight of scholarly commen-
tary has already done that job.10 Besides, in 2003, the International
6. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
7. NLRA, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006).
8. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 150.
9. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, § 101(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1)
(1994).
10. Hoffman Plastics has generated substantial commentary. Disagreeing with me, most
commentators worry that the decision will preclude workers from vindicating their rights
under other employment law regimes. See Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Com-
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Labour Organization’s Committee on Freedom of Association seemed
to settle the matter under international law by finding that the Hoff-
man Plastics decision left the United States with insufficient remedies
to ensure that undocumented workers are protected against anti-
union discrimination.11
Instead, the purpose of this Article is to explore whether the Hoff-
man Plastics way is the only way. The question is this: do international
legal regimes approach the collective bargaining rights of transborder
workers, like Jose Castro, in the same way as the U.S. Supreme
Court?12 Put another way, in any other context, are the labor rights of
documented or “regular” workers treated differently in the United
pounds, Inc. Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103 (2003); Ruben J.
Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immi-
gration and Labor Law, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 737 (2003); Marı´a Pabo´n Lo´pez, The Place
of the Undocumented Worker in the United States Legal System After Hoffman Plastics: An Assess-
ment and Comparison with Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301 (2005);
Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers Rights in a Post-Hoffman World—Organizing Around the
Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651 (2005). One scholar raised fears about the
effects a Hoffman Plastics-type decision would have even before Hoffman Plastics was de-
cided. See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protec-
tion and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 369 n.98 (2001). But I
predicted—so far accurately—that the decision’s legal impact on undocumented workers
would “be confined mostly to the ever shrinking world of the National Labor Relations
Act.” Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 5 (2003).
The legal status of undocumented workers in the United States continues to generate
substantial scholarly interest.  See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of
Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 1361 (2009) (constructing a framework for evaluat-
ing the spectrum of undocumented workers’ rights, from rights that are acknowledged to
those that are disputed); Kari L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigra-
tion Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125 (2009) (providing
an overview of the intersection between the federal immigration laws and various employ-
ment regimes, including the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Migrant Seasonal Agricul-
tural Worker Protection Act).
11. Complaints Against the Government of the United States Presented by the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) and
the Confederation of Mexican Workers (“CTM”), Report No. 332, Case No. 2227 (Oct. 18,
2002), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/caseframeE.htm (follow “by case”
hyperlink; then follow “2200” hyperlink; then follow “2227 United States” hyperlink)
[hereinafter Complaints Against the Government].
12. The argument that our courts should use international labor standards to inter-
pret domestic statutes—a position that can be controversial in this country unless the
United States has agreed to be bound by such standards—is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. Instead, the focus here is on America’s exceptionalism as demonstrated by the use of
the term “employee” to set limits on the protections granted by national labor policy. The
United States is not the only nation ambivalent about extending basic labor rights to un-
documented workers. See, e.g., Graeme Orr, Unauthorised Workers: Labouring Beneath the
Law?, in LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR MARKET REGULATION (Christopher Arup, Peter Gahan,
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States from the labor rights of undocumented or “irregular” workers?
The answer, as we shall see, is no.13
I. Who Counts as an “Employee” Under the NLRA?
Section 2(3) of the NLRA defines “employee” as follows:
The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this sub-
chapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor prac-
tice . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricul-
tural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or
any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or
John Howe, Richard Johnstone, Richard Mitchell & Anthony O’Donnell eds., 2006) (ex-
amining ambivalence in Australia).
13. Even in the United States, the logic of Hoffman Plastics has its limits. In at least five
cases decided under the NLRA, Hoffman Plastics has been all but limited to its facts.
In one NLRB decision, the administrative law judge found that seven undocumented
Latino bakery workers were entitled to back pay because there was no evidence they had
engaged in fraud or criminal activity when their employer knowingly and illegally hired
them. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., Case No. 29-CA-25476, 2006 WL 3196754 (N.L.R.B.
Div. of Judges 2005). In reviewing another NLRB decision, the District of Columbia Circuit
set forth that a kosher meat wholesaler had a duty to bargain with a union elected by a
bargaining unit in which half the workers either lacked social security numbers or had
numbers that did not match government records, which suggested the workers were un-
documented. Agri Processor Co., 347 N.L.R.B. 1200 (2006), enforced, 514 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008). In an Alabama case, the NLRB held that sections
8(a)(3) and (4) of the NLRA were violated when four undocumented Latino workers were
discharged for voting in a representation election, and rejected the employer’s contention
that the workers were ineligible to vote in the first place. Concrete Form Walls, Inc., 346
N.L.R.B. 831 (2006), enforced, 225 F. App’x. 837 (11th Cir. 2007).
In one California case, a majority of the NLRB left these precedents undisturbed, but
refused to find on the facts that the suspension and later discharge of a Latina worker due
to an expired work permit was in retaliation for her service as a union observer during a
representation election. Int’l Baking Co. & Earthgrains, 348 N.L.R.B. 76 (2006).
In another California case, the Ninth Circuit held that the NLRB was authorized to
enforce a consent decree calling for a roofing company to reinstate and pay back wages to
twenty workers fired in violation of the NLRA, even though many of them were undocu-
mented. NLRB v. C & C Roofing Supply, Inc., 569 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
Beyond the NLRA, virtually every decision reported by a court confronted with the
possibility of using Hoffman Plastics to restrict the remedies or rights of undocumented
workers under other employment regimes has refused to do so. In at least forty-four deci-
sions reported after Hoffman Plastics, courts either refused to follow, declined to extend,
distinguished, or recognized the limits of the holding in Hoffman Plastics. The reported
decisions include state and federal claims for employment discrimination, minimum
wages, prevailing wages, unemployment compensation, workers’ compensation, and work-
place safety. In some cases, they also include employer demands for discovery of the plain-
tiffs’ immigration status, which were generally denied. For some examples of the forty-four
cases, see infra note 90. R
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-2\SAN209.txt unknown Seq: 5 14-JAN-10 14:27
Fall 2009] THE BORDERS OF COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION 435
any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual em-
ployed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act . . . .14
By its express terms, section 2(3) is broad. It defines “employee”
as “any” employee, and indicates the definition “shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explic-
itly states otherwise.”15 The statute does go on to exclude from the
definition of “employee” a short but substantial list of various catego-
ries of worker. Though undocumented employees are not on this list,
the listed exclusions have the effect of removing huge segments of the
U.S. workforce from the protections offered under the NLRA.16 Indic-
ative of their continuing importance, many of these exclusions con-
tinue to be the subject of much-noticed litigation.
For example, the exclusion of supervisors was arguably expanded
by Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.,17 a 2006 decision by the NLRB. Interpret-
ing sections 2(2) and 2(11) of the NLRA, the NLRB held that perma-
nent charge nurses who direct the work of other nurses as a regular
and substantial part of their duties are supervisors who are excluded
from the protections of the NLRA.18 Advocates for organized labor
complained the decision would transform potentially millions of rank-
and-file employees into statutory supervisors. Of course, the question
of who must be excluded as a supervisor remains of continuing impor-
tance due to the inevitable conflicts arising between a statute drafted
to address the hierarchical industrial workplace of the mid-twentieth
century and the demands of the flatter management hierarchies now
so common in the twenty-first century workplace. The division be-
tween labor and management is no longer so clear.
Two other exclusions are of particular significance due to their
disproportionate effects on an undocumented worker’s right to free
association: agricultural laborers and domestic servants.
As to agricultural laborers,19 labor-management relations affect-
ing millions of farm workers are carved out of the NLRA; they remain
14. NLRA, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
15. Id.
16. These exclusions have been extensively catalogued—and criticized. See, e.g., Lance
Compa, Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States: The Gap Between Ideals and Practice,
in WORKERS RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 23–41 (James A. Gross ed., 2003).
17. 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006). Oakwood Healthcare was one of three important cases
interpreting the supervisor exclusion. See also Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 717 (2006);
Golden Crest Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. 727 (2006).
18. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 699–700.
19. To be considered agricultural, an employee’s duties must form an integral part of
ordinary farming operations, and such duties must be performed before the product can
be marketed through normal channels. Employees engaged primarily in duties that serve
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the exclusive province of the individual states in which they work.20
Yet only four states—Arizona, California, Idaho, and Kansas—have
passed agricultural labor relations statutes. These statutes are pat-
terned somewhat after the NLRA, in that they provide for employee
elections and unfair labor practice proceedings.21
As to domestic servants,22 a veritable army of babysitters, cooks,
home healthcare providers, maids, nannies, and others who work pri-
marily in the home are excluded from the NLRA. A substantial per-
centage of this group is undocumented. Perhaps this is why a growing
number of home health care workers in selected states are gaining
collective bargaining rights with “employers of record” established by
legislation.23
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has added a previously un-
listed exclusion: undocumented workers. This development cannot be
explained by the plain meaning of the NLRA. Section 2(3) defines
“employee” as “any” employee, and “shall not be limited to the em-
ployees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly
states otherwise.”24 But nowhere does the subchapter containing sec-
tion 2(3) “explicitly state[ ] otherwise” as to undocumented workers.25
In fact, the NLRA makes no reference at all to the status of foreign
nationals in the U.S. workforce.
Eleven million or more undocumented people are estimated to
currently live in the United States;26 the precise number is notoriously
difficult to calculate. From 2000 to 2008, undocumented workers in
this country have grown by thirty-seven percent.27 Whether everyone
to increase the value of already-marketable products do not fall within the exclusion.
Under this interpretation, workers engaged in packing, processing, refining, and slaugh-
tering have found to be protected by the Act. See Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392
(1996); Bayside Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
20. Most of these states refer to common law principles, “little” Wagner or Norris-
LaGuardia Acts, or both. See, e.g., Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 888 P.2d 147 (Wash. 1995).
21. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979). California’s Agricul-
tural Labor Relations Act is one of the more comprehensive statutes. See Agric. Labor Rela-
tions Bd. v. Super. Ct., 546 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1976).
22. A substantial amount of literature analyzes some of the gaps left by the statutory
exclusion of domestic workers from labor and other protective legislation. See generally
MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A. (2d ed. 2002).
23. See Stu Schneider, Victories for Home Health Care Workers: Home Health Care Workers
Get Organized, DOLLARS & SENSE, Sep./Oct. 2003, at 25–27 (2003).
24. NLRA, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
25. See id.
26. MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN C. BAKER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES:
JANUARY 2008, at 1 (2009).
27. Id.
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welcomes them or not, undocumented immigrants play an indispensa-
ble role in the American workforce.28 Workers lacking papers consti-
tute a huge fraction, if not a majority, of the labor found in many low-
wage industries. Latinos, for example, increasingly dominate agricul-
ture, culinary service, domestic employment, health care, janitorial
service, and poultry processing.29 Although most Latinos are legal re-
sidents, a substantial portion is undocumented and concentrated in
low-wage work.
In theory, an undocumented worker should enjoy the same rights
in the workplace that other workers do. The Supreme Court has held
that such workers are indeed “employees” under the NLRA.30 To this
end, the District of Columbia Circuit Court has held that undocu-
mented workers are entitled to have their votes counted in a represen-
tation election.31 The NLRB’s general counsel has taken a similar
position.32
In practice, however, the undocumented worker is treated differ-
ently. For example, it is hornbook labor law that workers discharged
for engaging in union organizing, or other activities protected by the
NLRA, are entitled to reinstatement and back pay to make them
whole for their injuries.33 Yet in 1984, the Supreme Court, interpret-
ing the old Immigration and Nationalization Act,34 held that undocu-
mented workers must be denied the reinstatement remedy.35 In 2002,
the Court, attempting to reconcile the NLRA with the newer Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act, added that undocumented workers
must be denied back pay for the same reason.36
As Part II demonstrates, the Hoffman Plastics way is not the only
way. In fact, Hoffman Plastics is based on a distinction that is either
28. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future of
the American Labor Movement Depends on Latino Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1089, 1091–93
(1999).
29. Id.
30. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892–94 (1984).
31. Agri Processor Co., 514 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594
(2008).
32. See Memorandum from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, NLRB, to All Re-
gional Directors, Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers, on Procedures and Remedies
for Discriminates Who May Be Undocumented Aliens After Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc., NLRB GC 02-06, B-3 (July 19, 2002) (declaring employee’s immigration status to be
“irrelevant” in representation proceedings).
33. See, e.g., DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, LABOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 95–96 (5th ed. 2008).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1101, amended by Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [herein-
after IRCA].
35. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 899.
36. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150 (2002).
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unknown to, or explicitly rejected by, the framers of international la-
bor standards codified in at least eighteen instruments, containing as
many as thirty-one separate provisions, arguably protective of undocu-
mented workers.37
II. Who Counts as an “Employee” Under International Labor
Standards?
The nomenclature attached to the world’s basic international la-
bor standard is “freedom of association.” It includes, among other
things, the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike. Free-
dom of association has long been acknowledged as a universal or fun-
damental right.38
The specific labor standards associated with freedom of associa-
tion are established in a widely accepted body of international norms.
They flow from five sources of international law codified in at least
eighteen separate instruments: (1) human rights instruments devel-
oped by the United Nations and related organizations; (2) conven-
tions and other documents elaborated through worker, employer, and
government representatives at the International Labour Organisation
(“ILO”); (3) human rights instruments created by regional govern-
mental bodies; (4) labor rights clauses in international trade agree-
ments; and (5) the governing documents of the European Union.
The United States has accepted obligations under some, but not all, of
these instruments.39
For the purposes of this Article, the key common feature of these
eighteen instruments is that the term “employee” is not found in any
37. For a table listing each of these eighteen instruments, together with the thirty-one
relevant provisions, see infra Appendix A.
38. I am indebted to Professor Lance Compa—whose influence is felt throughout this
paper—for his comprehensive work summarizing the key international labor standards. See
Compa, supra note 16, at 23–41. I am also grateful to the team of co-authors whose text- R
book enriched my knowledge of the field. See JAMES ATLESON, LANCE COMPA, KERRY RIT-
TICH, CALVIN SHARPE & MARLEY WEISS, INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008); see also, ROGER BLANPLAIN, SUSAN BISOM-
RAPP, WILLIAM R. CORBETT, HILARY K. JOSEPHS & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, THE GLOBAL WORK-
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS LAW 288
(2007) [hereinafter THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE].
39. There have been prior published efforts to address the application of the interna-
tional labor standards codified in many of these eighteen instruments in a systemic, albeit
somewhat less comprehensive, way. See Sarah Cleveland, Beth Lyon & Rebecca Smith, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief: The United States Violates International Law
When Labor Remedies Are Restricted Based on Workers’ Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 795 (2003); see also Jill Borak, A Wink and a Nod: The Hoffman Case and Its Effects on
Freedom of Association for Undocumented Workers, 10 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 20 (2003).
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of them.40 Instead, the broader terms “everyone,” “[e]very person,” or
“worker[ ]” are used.41 Except for United Nations Resolution 40/144,
the eighteen instruments make no explicit attempt to differentiate be-
tween employees based on documented versus undocumented or reg-
ular versus irregular status.
A. International Human Rights Instruments
At least five instruments containing thirteen separate provisions
establish international labor standards for undocumented workers by
framing such standards in terms of human rights.
Article 20(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”) states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful as-
sembly and association.”42 Moreover, Article 23(4) states: “Everyone
has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.”43 As noted above, freedom of association has long been
considered a basic human right that includes the right to form, join,
and seek the assistance of trade unions. One of the three founding
documents of the United Nations, the UDHR was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. Like all United Nations member
nations, the United States is bound to the obligations created by the
UDHR. (In fact, one of its co-authors was Eleanor Roosevelt.)
Article 22(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”) declares: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of association with others, including the right to form and join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.”44 The United States ratified
the ICCPR in 1992. In doing so, it took several reservations, under-
standings, and declarations limiting or avoiding various obligations in
the covenant. Notably, it took no reservations, understandings, or dec-
larations with respect to Article 22(1) on the right to form and join
trade unions, or to Article 2(3) requiring an “effective remedy” for
rights violations.45
Article 8(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights obligates governments to “ensure . . . the right of
40. Occasionally, however, the term “employment” is used to indicate a working rela-
tionship for remuneration. See infra Appendix A.
41. Id.
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 20(1), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
43. Id. art. 23(4).
44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 22(1), Mar. 23, 1967, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
45. Id. art. 2(3)(a).
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everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice,”
“the right of trade unions to function freely . . . [and] . . .the right to
strike . . . .”46 This instrument has not been ratified by the United
States, but under principles of international law more generally ac-
cepted outside the United States, the country is considered bound to
its standards anyway.
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (“Migrant Work-
ers Convention”) is one of the few instruments to deal specifically with
the problems faced by persons working in “irregular” employment—
that is, workers who do not have legal status in the countries in which
they are living and working, including the undocumented.
Procedurally, Article 2(1) of the Migrant Workers Convention de-
fines a “migrant worker” as “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged
or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he
or she is not a national.”47 Article 25(1) states: “Migrant workers shall
enjoy treatment not less favourable than that which applies to nation-
als of the State of employment in respect of remuneration . . . .”48
Related to this, Article 25(3) states:
[Bound countries] shall take all appropriate measures to ensure
that migrant workers are not deprived of any rights derived from
this principle by reason of any irregularity in their stay or employ-
ment. In particular, employers shall not be relieved of any legal or
contractual obligations, nor shall their obligations be limited in
any manner by reason of such irregularity.49
Substantively, Article 26(1) of the Migrant Workers Convention
guarantees “the right of migrant workers and members of their fami-
lies . . . [t]o take part in meetings and activities of trade unions . . .
[t]o join freely any trade union . . . [and] [t]o seek the aid and assis-
tance of any trade union.”50 Like the labor standards codified in other
human rights conventions, the labor standards set forth in the Mi-
grant Workers Convention are not absolute. Language found in Arti-
cle 26(2) is typical: “No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of
these rights other than those that are prescribed by law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
46. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 8(1)(a),
(c)–(d), Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
47. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families art. 2(1), July 1, 2003, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Mi-
grant Workers Convention].
48. Id. art 25(1).
49. Id. art. 25(3).
50. Id. art. 26(1).
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public order (ordre public) or the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others.”51
The Migrant Workers Convention is especially notable for
broadly protecting families as well as workers. Families’ rights include
freedom of religion and expression, privacy, property, urgent medical
care, access to education, and in some circumstances, other state-sup-
ported benefits.
Perhaps because the protections offered by the Migrant Workers
Convention are so broad, its reach remains quite narrow. As of Octo-
ber 2009, only forty-two countries—none of them developed nations
such as the United States or Canada—had become parties to it.52
Finally, there is United Nations Resolution 40/144, otherwise
known as the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who
Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live. This document
is unique for using the term “aliens” to refer to non-citizen workers.
Drawing on provisions in the United Nations Charter encouraging
universal respect for and observance of fundamental human rights,
Article 8(1) of United Nations Resolution 40/144 states: “Aliens law-
fully residing in the territory of a State shall also enjoy” certain
rights,53 including “[t]he right to join trade unions and other organi-
zations or associations of their choice . . . .”54 But Article 8 says the
enjoyment of such rights is qualified by Article 4,55 which provides:
“Aliens shall observe the laws of the State in which they reside or are
present and regard with respect the customs and traditions of the peo-
ple of that State.”56 It may well be that modifying “aliens” with the
term “lawfully” in Article 8, taken together with the qualifier in Article
4, effectively guarantees only to documented or regular workers the
right to enjoy freedom of association. In any event, under Article
8(1)(b), aliens remain subject to having such restrictions placed on
51. Id. art. 26(2); see also, ICCPR, supra note 44, arts. 22(1) and 22(2) (limiting rights R
to associate freely and to join trade unions); ICESCR, supra note 46, arts. 8(1)(c), 8(2) R
(limiting rights of trade unions, military personnel, and police personnel); UDHR, supra
note 42, art. 29(2) (limiting human rights). R
52. United Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org (follow “Status of Trea-
ties” hyperlink; then “Chapter IV” hyperlink; and follow hyperlink 13 “International Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families. New York, Dec. 18, 1990) (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
53. Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the
Country in Which They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, art. 8(1), U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 116th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/144 (Dec. 13, 1985).
54. Id. art. 8(1)(b).
55. Id. art. 8(1).
56. Id. art. 4.
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their right to freedom of association “which are necessary, in a demo-
cratic society, in the interests of national security or public order or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”57
B. ILO Conventions
At least three ILO instruments containing four separate provi-
sions establish international labor standards for undocumented work-
ers. These standards have been elaborated by the ILO’s Committee on
Freedom of Association (“CFA”) after decades of careful considera-
tion of worldwide allegations concerning violations of workers’ rights
to form or join labor organizations, to engage in collective bargaining,
and to go on strike.
Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise provides: “Workers and em-
ployers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to estab-
lish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to
join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisa-
tion.”58 The words “without distinction whatsoever” make clear that
the rights of undocumented workers are not to be treated less favora-
bly than those of documented workers.
Article 1(1) of ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise
and Collective Bargaining declares: “Workers shall enjoy adequate
protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their
employment.”59 The words “adequate protection” suggest that the
remedies available to undocumented workers are not to be less
favorable than those afforded to documented workers. Article 1(2)
adds:
Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts cal-
culated to [ ] (a) make the employment of a worker subject to the
condition that he shall not join a union or shall relinquish trade
union membership; (b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise
prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or because of
participation in union activities . . . .60
57. Id. art. 8(1)(b).
58. International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise art. 2, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17,
reprinted in ILO, CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 527 (1996) [hereinafter ILO C. 87].
59. International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Appli-
cation of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively art. 1(1), July 1,
1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257, reprinted in ILO, CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 639 (1996)
[hereinafter ILO C. 98].
60. Id. art. 1(2)(a)–(b).
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The United States has ratified neither ILO Convention No. 87
nor ILO Convention No. 98. But it has accepted obligations relating
to freedom of association under these conventions by virtue of its
membership in the International Labour Organisation.61 This is due
to a third ILO instrument: the Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work (“DFPRW”). Article 2 of the DFPRW states:
[A]ll members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of member-
ship in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in
good faith and in accordance with the [ILO] Constitution, the
principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the sub-
ject of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of association and
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining . . . .62
Citing the DFPRW,63 the American Federation of Labor and Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations, together with the Confederacio´n de
Trabajadores de Mexico, filed a complaint with the ILO’s CFA. The
complaint alleged that the Hoffman Plastics decision violated the
United States’ obligations under the DFPRW. In 2003, the CFA issued
a report finding that eliminating the back pay remedy left the U.S.
government with insufficient means for ensuring that undocumented
workers are protected from anti-union discrimination.64 This decision
is binding on the United States by virtue of its having accepted obliga-
tions under the DFPRW.
61. International Labour Organization, Report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation
Commission on Freedom of Association Concerning the Trade Union Situation in Chile,
para. 466 (1975).
62. International Labour Organisation, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work art. 2(a), June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233 [hereinafter DFPRW].
63. To those unfamiliar with the nuances of international law, there might seem to be
a contradiction between recognizing a nation’s sovereign power to refrain from signing or
ratifying an instrument codifying international labor standards, and holding that nation to
the obligations under some of those standards anyway. This apparent contradiction was
addressed in commentary to the DFPRW. The commentary, which was written by the chief
of the Equality and Human Rights Coordination Branch of the ILO, explains the basis of
every nation’s obligations under the DFPRW arises from its membership in the ILO. There-
fore, declarations on behalf of the entire organization—such as the DFPRW—are binding
even though the precise labor standards set forth in conventions like ILO C. 87 and ILO C.
98 may not be. As the commentator put it:
This does not mean that the Conventions the ILO has adopted to develop
these [international labor] principles will be extended to member States which
have not ratified them. It means rather that States have an obligation to pursue
the realization of the principles in ways appropriate to their own situation, and to
report regularly on how they do so.
Lee Swepston, Introductory Note, International Labour Conference: ILO Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work and Annex, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1234 (1998).
64. See Complaints Against the Government, supra note 11. R
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C. Regional Human Rights Instruments
At least four regional human rights instruments containing as
many as five separate provisions establish international labor stan-
dards for undocumented workers in the Americas.
Article XXII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Du-
ties of Man states: “Every person has the right to associate with others
to promote, exercise and protect his legitimate interests of a political,
economic, religious, social, cultural, professional, labor union or
other nature.”65 The reference to “[e]very person” does not admit dis-
tinctions due to immigration status. The instrument was the world’s
first human rights instrument of a general nature, predating the
UDHR by about six months. It was adopted in Bogota´, Colombia, at
the same meeting that created the thirty-five member Organization of
American States (“OAS”). The United States is a member of the OAS,
which is headquartered in Washington, D.C.
Relevant to this point, Article 29(a) of the Charter of the OAS
provides: “All human beings, without distinction as to . . . social condi-
tion, have the right to attain material well-being and spiritual growth
under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and
economic security.”66 Article 29(b) adds: “Work is a right and a social
duty . . . it demands respect for freedom of association and for the
dignity of the worker . . . .”67
Section 16(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights de-
clares: “Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, relig-
ious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other
purposes.”68 Moreover, section 8(1) of the Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, So-
cial, and Culture Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”) states that par-
ties to the Protocol of San Salvador “shall ensure: [t]he right of
workers to organize under trade unions and to join the union of their
choice for the purpose of protecting and promoting their interests.”69
65. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. XXII, May 2, 1948,
OAS Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth Int’l Conf. of Amer. States, reprinted in BASIC DOCU-
MENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82
doc. 6 rev. 1 at 17 (1992).
66. Charter of the Organization of American States art. 29(a), Dec. 13, 1951, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
67. Id. art. 29(b).
68. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
16(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
69. Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Culture Rights art. 8(1)(a),
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-2\SAN209.txt unknown Seq: 15 14-JAN-10 14:27
Fall 2009] THE BORDERS OF COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION 445
Concerned that the Hoffman Plastics decision violated the princi-
ples codified by these instruments, the Republic of Mexico, following
a path similar to that taken by American and Mexican trade unionists
before the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association, filed a case
with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”). In 2003,
the IACHR issued an opinion advising that, despite their irregular sta-
tus, undocumented workers in the United States are frequently
treated unfavorably compared to other workers.70 The decision, how-
ever, is not binding on the United States.
D. Labor Rights Clauses in Free Trade Agreements
At least four free trade agreements containing as many as five
separate provisions establish international labor standards for bilateral
or multilateral trade relations between the United States and other
countries.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)71—to
which Canada, Mexico, and the United States are parties—includes a
labor side agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Co-
operation (“NAALC”). The first three “labor principles” codified in
the NAALC are (1) freedom of association and protection of the right
to organize, (2) the right to bargain collectively, and (3) protection of
the right to strike.72 To the point, Article 4(1) of NAALC provides:
“Each Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest
under its law in a particular matter have appropriate access to admin-
istrative, quasi-judicial, judicial or labor tribunals for the enforcement
of the Party’s labor law.”73 Moreover, Article 4(2) states: “Each party’s
law shall ensure that such persons may have recourse to, as appropri-
ate, procedures by which rights arising under: [ ] its labor law, includ-
ing in respect of . . . employment standards, industrial relations and
migrant workers . . .” can be enforced.74 At first glance, the guarantees
of “appropriate access” and “recourse” to “appropriate” procedures
Nov. 16, 1999, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, at 67 (1992) [hereinafter Protocol of San
Salvador].
70. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opin-
ion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, at 106, 136 (Sept. 17, 2003).
71. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
72. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
49(1)(a)–(c), Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
73. Id. art. 4(1).
74. Id. art. 4(2).
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for “migrant workers” would not seem to make any distinctions as to
undocumented migrant workers. But Article 4(1) clearly does; it obli-
gates the signatory nation to ensure rights as to “persons with a legally
recognized interest under its law in a particular matter”75—thereby
leaving room for domestic immigration laws restricting the rights of
undocumented and other persons without “legally” recognized
interests.
Article 16(1) of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) “reaffirm[s]” the parties’
“obligations as members of the [ILO] and their commitments under
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its
Follow-Up . . . .”76 Thus CAFTA incorporates by reference Article 2 of
the DFPRW, which requires the United States to honor the principles
set forth in ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 and their implications
for undocumented workers. Moreover, Article 16(2) of CAFTA states
that “[a] party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws . . . .”77
Similarly, Article 6(1) of the Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Es-
tablishment of a Free Trade Area (“Jordan Free Trade Agreement”)
“reaffirm[s]” the parties’ “obligations as members of the [ILO] and
their commitments under” the DFPRW to “strive to ensure that such
labor principles and the internationally recognized labor rights . . .
are recognized and protected by domestic law.”78
To the same effect, Article 17(1) of the United States-Columbia
Trade Promotion Agreement (“Columbia TPA”) “reaffirm[s]” the par-
ties’ obligations as members of the ILO.79 Article 17(2) also requires
each party to “adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and
practices thereunder, the following rights, as stated in” the DFPRW.80
75. Id. art. 4(1).
76. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement art.
16(1)(1), Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004) (draft text) [hereinafter
CAFTA].
77. Id. art. 16(2)(1)(a).
78. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan art. 6(1), Oct. 24, 2000, 41
I.L.M. 63.
79. United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement art. 17(1)(1), Nov. 22,
2006, (not in force) [hereinafter Colombia TPA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta (last visited Oct. 12, 2009)
80. Id. art. 17(2)(1).
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E. European Union Governing Documents
Even though the United States is obviously not a member of the
European Union (“EU”), the EU is often held up as a successful
model of social, cultural, and economic—if not political—integration.
The free movement of persons in general, and workers in particular,
is one of the cornerstones of EU governance.81 No distinction is made
between “worker” and “employee.” Indeed, in proclaiming this right,
the EU’s governing documents go much further than the NAALC
does—or even international labor standards do—by abolishing dis-
tinctions between workers based on citizenship.
At least two EU instruments containing some four relevant provi-
sions are illustrative: the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity (“EC Treaty”) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (“EU Charter”). Under these instruments, a single
internal market is established in accordance with four fundamental
freedoms: “the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.”82 Al-
though the EU Charter declares freedom of movement to be a funda-
mental right of workers, it is limited to the purpose of performing
economic activity: “Mobility of labour . . . is looked upon as one of the
means by which the worker is guaranteed the possibility of improving
his living and working conditions and promoting his social advance-
ment, while helping to satisfy the requirements of the economies of
the Member States.”83
To these ends, Article 39 of the EC Treaty provides: “Such free-
dom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and
employment.”84
Further, Article 12 of the EU Charter states: “Everyone has the
right to . . . freedom of association at all levels, in particular in politi-
cal, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone
81. See THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE, supra 38. R
82. Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version) art.
3(1)(c), Apr. 16, 2003, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 44 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
83. Council Reg. No. 1612/68, Oct. 15, 1968, 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. 475, amended by Reg.
312/76, Feb. 9, 1976, 1976 O.J. (L 3/2) and Council Reg. No. 2434/92, 1992 O.J. (L 25).
84. EC Treaty art. 39(2); see, e.g., Case C-415/93, URBSFA v. Bosman, 995 E.C.R. 4921
(1995) (declaring transfer fee—mandated by rules of FIFA and other sporting associa-
tions—to be paid by acquiring professional soccer club to player’s former club to violate
Article 39).
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to form and join trade unions for the protection of his or her
interests.”85
III. Hoffman Plastics Revisited: Some Thoughts About Who Counts
For at least three reasons, courts in the United States should con-
sider limiting Hoffman Plastics to its narrow facts and reinterpret the
NLRA to conform to international labor principles by including un-
documented workers as “employees” who are entitled to the full rights
and remedies guaranteed by the law.86
First, as demonstrated by Part II, the plain meaning of section
2(3) of the NLRA does not support carving out undocumented work-
ers from the definition of “employee.” If anything, the otherwise
broad language of that provision, coupled with its short but certain list
of exceptions, demonstrates that Congress knew precisely how to
carve out categories of non-employees. To argue otherwise is to con-
clude, by inference or implication, that Congress intended to omit
millions of working people who were contributing to the lifeblood of
our economy, for no reason other than the accident of their citizen-
ship. There is no evidence of this intent in the language or legislative
history of either NLRA or IRCA.
Second, as demonstrated by this Part III, the pull of international
labor standards away from Hoffman Plastics is strong. Table 1 summa-
rizes the information from the eighteen instruments discussed in this
section.
85. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 12(1), Dec. 7, 2000,
2000 O.J. (C 364) 11.
86. Pointing to recent decisions from the courts in the European Union, Professor
Judy Fudge has sounded a cautionary note about the project of “constitutionalizing”
human rights—including international labor standards—by incorporating them into re-
gional or national legal regimes. Of particular concern is the paradox by which courts
recognize such rights broadly but apply them narrowly. See Judy Fudge, Constitutionalizing
Labour Rights in Europe, in RESCUING HUMAN RIGHTS (Tim Campbell & Keith Ewing eds.,
forthcoming 2010); see also Judy Fudge, The New Discourse of Labour Rights: From Social to
Fundamental Rights?, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 29 (2007).
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TABLE 1
Terminology Used in International Labor Rights Instruments
Term Used Number
Everyone, every person, all human beings 7
Workers or migrant workers 6
Aliens or similar term87 2
Employees 0
Of the eighteen instruments examined here, none use the term
“employee”; instead, thirteen use the terms “everyone,” “every per-
son,” or “all human beings” (seven instruments) and “worker” or “mi-
grant worker” (six other instruments).88 Even the few documents
using more restrictive language—either “alien” or “persons with a le-
gally recognized interest” (two instruments)—do not use the term
“employee.”89 Of course, in this country, international labor standards
are rarely, if ever, relied upon to rewrite the terms adopted by Con-
gress in the labor and immigration statutes. But they can be looked to
for guidance in resolving doubts and ambiguities. By virtue of the
United States having accepted obligations under such standards, it
would seem imperative to take this approach; otherwise, the accept-
ance of such obligations would mean little. Any doubts or ambiguities
about whether “employees” are entitled to remedies for violations of
their rights in the workplace can be readily resolved by reference to
international labor standards applicable to “everyone,” “every person,”
or “workers.” In short, as this discussion demonstrates, the Hoffman
Plastics way is not the only way.
Finally, as a practical matter, the lower state and federal courts
are already doing what this Article suggests. With few exceptions, they
are following the spirit, if not the letter, of international labor stan-
dards applicable to irregular workers. By my count, there are at least
forty-four reported decisions in which the court addressed the argu-
ment that Hoffman Plastics should limit the remedies or rights of un-
documented workers for violations of state or federal employment
laws, including employment discrimination, minimum wage, prevail-
ing wage, unemployment compensation, workers’ compensation, and
workplace safety laws. (In some of these decisions, employers sought
to discover the immigration status of plaintiffs who were probably un-
documented.) None of these decisions expressly relied on the instru-
87. See NAALC, supra note 72 (“persons with a legally recognized interest under [the R
country’s] law in a particular matter”).
88. See infra Appendix A.
89. Id.
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ments codifying international labor standards discussed in this Article.
Yet, in all forty-four reported decisions, the court refused to follow,
declined to extend, distinguished, or recognized the limits of, the
holding in Hoffman Plastics.90
Why are post-Hoffman Plastics courts doing this? A review of the
opinions accompanying these decisions suggests at least two reasons:
first, as with the NLRA and IRCA, nothing in the plain language of the
applicable state or federal employment statute suggests that withhold-
ing remedies or rights from undocumented workers would comport
with sound public policy; and second, ruling otherwise would simply
give offending employers an undeserved windfall for breaking the law.
The latter is especially true as to back pay for workers who have al-
ready performed the work. As the Kansas Supreme Court put it in a
prevailing wage case: “[W]e conclude that to deny or to dilute an ac-
tion for wages earned but not paid on the ground that such employ-
ment contracts are ‘illegal,’ would thus directly contravene the public
policy of the State of Kansas.”91
The implications of reconsidering who counts as an “employee,”
and what remedies they are entitled to, are enormous. About eleven
million undocumented persons reside within the borders of the
United States.92 Most of these people are engaged in some type of
work; one source estimates the number of unauthorized workers at
8.3 million, or about 5.4% of the nation’s workforce.93 Undocu-
mented workers are concentrated in low-wage industries, such as agri-
culture, construction, food processing, garment manufacturing, the
hospitality industry, and landscaping. Indeed, undocumented workers
may represent about ten percent of all low-wage workers in the United
States, and as much as fifty to sixty percent of the agricultural
workforce.94 If U.S. employers—and by extension, consumers—are
90. For a sample of these forty-four decisions, see, e.g., Coma Corp. v. Kansas Dep’t of
Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1092 (Kan. 2007); Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 78
(2007); Madeira v. Affordable Housing Found, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d,
469 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (not followed on state law grounds).  A complete list is on file
with author.
91. Coma Corp., 154 P.3d at 1092; see, e.g., Reyes, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 78 (“[S]uch awards
do not condone future unauthorized work; rather they make it clear that employers should
not be allowed to profit from employing undocumented workers and then exploiting
them.”).
92. HOEFER, RYTINA & BAKER, supra note 26, at 1. R
93. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, A PORTRAIT OF UNAU-
THORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES i (2009).
94. Wayne A. Cornelius & Takeyuki Tsuda, Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Gov-
ernment Intervention, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 20 (Wayne A.
Cornelius et al. eds., 2004).
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willing to accept the benefits of undocumented work, then they
should also accept its costs, in the form of respecting work-related
rights.
As of 2005, one United Nations report estimated that around the
world some 191 million people were living outside the country in
which they were born.95 The World Commission on the Social Dimen-
sions of Globalization more conservatively estimated that there were
fifteen to thirty million irregular migrants.96 But if the estimate of
eleven million undocumented persons by the United States is accu-
rate, then both estimates are probably too low.
In any event, eleven million is an awfully lot of people from
whom to take away fundamental human rights with a whisper, rather
than a shout, as Hoffman Plastics did. Many of them are marginal work-
ers and people of color. To some Americans, the terms “undocu-
mented worker” and “Hispanic” are synonyms. Of course, not all
undocumented workers are Hispanic, but there is little doubt that
workers of Latino origins are disproportionately affected. So, too,
have many Chinese, Thai, and Filipino workers been the subject of
sensational reports about their mistreatment.
We sometimes forget that the primary means of enforcing most
labor standards—from minimum wages to safe working conditions—is
voluntary compliance. To back up voluntary compliance, most U.S.
employment law regimes rely on supervision by government agencies,
the availability of workers’ private rights of action, or some combina-
tion of the two. But these mechanisms have their limits; government
officials may lack the resources or political will, and private rights of
action may be too expensive for low- or middle-income workers. With-
out the availability of one, the other, or both, voluntary compliance by
employers may be minimal. Trade unions can fill the gap by provid-
ing, outside the vagaries of state bureaucracies, an inexpensive means
of enforcing not only collectively bargained rights, but also minimum
labor standards. To deny undocumented workers access to trade
unionism is to effectively deny them access to viable means of enforc-
ing a wide variety of other substantive rights.
95. U.N. Dep’t Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Division, International Migration Re-
port 2006: A Global Assessment xiv, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.209 (2009), available at http://
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006_MigrationRep/exec_sum.pdf (indicating
the United States hosted the largest number of migrants—thirty-eight million—in 2005,
followed by the Russian Federation with twelve million and Germany with ten million).
96. World Comm’n on the Soc. Dimensions of Globalization, June 1–17, 2004, A Fair
Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All 96, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/en-
glish/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf.
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Today it is often argued that labor rights are human rights. If so,
then international labor laws—including those guaranteeing access to
the institutions of collective bargaining—should be respected more
across national borders.97 And, why not? After all, the laws of labor
economics operate without reference to national borders. In so many
industries, jobs are established where labor costs are the most attrac-
tive, and people, irrespective of their nationality, will be attracted to
go wherever those jobs are located. As a result, “[t]he reasons for con-
cluding international treaties on labour rights may thus be seen as
primarily protective of employees, redressing the imbalance of their
otherwise enfeebled status[]”98—without regard to the citizenship of
these employees.
97. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal
Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 63–68 (2001).
98. Janet Dine, Human Rights and Company Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 209, 210 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999).
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APPENDIX A
Instruments Codifying International Labor Standards on
Freedom of Association for Undocumented Workers
(Highlighting Terms Used Instead of “Employee”)
(* indicates obligations accepted by the U.S.)
International Human Rights Instruments
1.* Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
20(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
23(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.
2.* International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1967, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
22(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including
the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
22(2) No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public order (odre public), the protection of health
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of
the police in their exercise of this right.
22(3) Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour
Convention of 1948 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in
such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
8(1) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
(a) the right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice,
subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and
protection of his economic social interest. No restrictions may be placed on the
exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interest of national security or public order or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
(b) the right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and
the right of the latter to form or join international trade–union organizations;
(c) the right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than
those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others;
(d) the right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the
particular country.
8(3) Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organise to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply
the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that
Convention.
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4. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, July 1, 2003, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
2(1) The term “migrant worker” refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or
has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a
national.
26(1) States Parties recognize the right of migrant workers and members of their families
(a) to take part in meeting and activities of trade unions and of any other associations
established in accordance with the law, with a view to protecting their economic,
social, cultural and other interests, subject only to the rules of the organization
concerned;
(b) to join freely any trade union and any such associations as aforesaid, subject only
to the rules of the organization concerned;
(c) to seek the aid and assistance of any trade union and of any such association as
aforesaid;
26(2) No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those
that are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public order (ordre public) or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
5.* Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the
Country in Which They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 116th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/144 (Dec. 13, 1985).
1. For the purposes of this Declaration, the term “alien” shall apply, with due regard
to qualifications made in subsequent articles, to any individual who is not a national
of the State in which he or she is present.
4. Aliens shall observe the laws of the State in which they reside or are present and
regard with respect to the customs and traditions of the people of that State.
8(1) Aliens lawfully residing in the territory of a State shall also enjoy, in accordance
with the national laws, the following rights, subject to their obligations under article 4:
. . .
(b) The right to join trade unions and other organizations or associations of their
choice and to participate in their activities. No restrictions may be placed on the
exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary, in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security or public order or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others[.]
6. International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17,
reprinted in ILO, CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 527 (1996).
2. Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to
establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join
organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.
7. International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application
of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96
U.N.T.S. 257, reprinted in ILO, CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 639 (1996).
1(1) Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination
in respect of their employment.
1(2) Such protection shall apply more particular in respect of acts calculated to—
(a) make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join a
union or shall relinquish trade membership;
(b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union
membership or because of participation in union activities outside working hour or,
with the consent of the employer, within working hours.
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8.* International Labour Organisation, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233.
2. Declares that all Members, even if they have no ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the
Organization, to respect, to promote, and to realize, in good faith and in accordance
with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the
subject of those Conventions, namely:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining . . . .
Regional Human Rights Instruments
9.* American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, OAS Res. No.
XXX, adopted by the Ninth Int’l Conf. of Amer. States, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.
6 rev. 1 at 17 (1992).
XXII Right of Association. Every person has the right to associate with others to
promote, exercise and protect his legitimate interests of a political, economic,
religious, social, cultural, professional, labor union or other nature.
10.* Charter of the Organization of American States, Dec. 13, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
29. The Member States agree upon the desirability of developing their social
legislation the following bases:
(a) All human beings, without distinction as to  . . . social condition, have the right to
attain material well-being and spiritual growth under circumstances of liberty, dignity,
equality of opportunity, and economic security;
(b) Work is a right and a social duty; it shall not be considered as an article of
commerce; it demands respect for freedom of association and for the dignity of the
worker . . . .
11. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
16(1) Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political,
economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.
12. Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Culture Rights, Nov. 16, 1999,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 at 67 (1992).
8(1) The States Parties shall ensure:
(a) The right of workers to organize under trade unions and to join the union of their
choice for the purpose of protecting and promoting their interests. As an extension of
that right, the State Parties shall permit trade unions to establish national federations
or confederations, or to affiliate with those that already exist, as well as to form
international trade union organizations and to affiliate with that of their choice. The
State Parties shall also permit trade unions, federations and confederations to
function freely;
(b) The right to strike.
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FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
13.* North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
4(1) Each Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in
a particular matter have appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial, judicial or
labor tribunals for the enforcement of the Party’s labor law.
4(2) Each Party’s law shall ensure that such persons may have recourse to, as
appropriate, procedures by which rights arising under:
(a) its labor law, including in respect of occupational safety and health, employment
standards, industrial relations and migrant workers, and
(b) collective agreements . . . .
49. Definitions- “labor law” means laws and regulations, or provisions thereof, that are
directly related to:
(a) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize;
(b) the right to bargain collectively;
(c) the right to strike . . . .
14.* Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5,
2004, 119 Stat. 462, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004) (draft text).
16(1) The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration) . . . .
16(2)(1)(a) A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade
between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
16(8) Definitions- For the purposes of this Chapter:
[L]abor laws means a Party’s statutes or regulations, or provisions thereof, that are
directly related to the following internationally recognized labor rights:
(a) The right of association;
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
[S]tatutes or regulations means:
(b) for the United States, acts of Congress or regulations promulgated pursuant to an
act of Congress that are enforceable by action of the federal government.
15.* Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41
I.L.M. 63.
6(1) The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor
Organization (“ILO”) and their commitments under the ILO Declaration of
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. The Parties shall strive
to ensure that such labor principles and the internationally recognized labors rights
set forth in paragraph 6 are protected by domestic law.
6(6) For purposes of this Article, “labor laws” means statutes and regulations, or
provisions thereof, that are directly related to the following internationally recognized
labor rights:
(a) the right of association;
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively[.]
16.* United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Nov. 22, 2006 (not in force).
17(1) The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International Labor
Organization (ILO).
17(2) Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and
practices thereunder, the following rights, as stated in the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration):
(a) freedom of association;
(b) the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining[.]
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European Union Instruments
17. Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version), Apr. 16, 2003,
2006 O.J. (C 321) 44.
Art. 39 (formerly Art. 48):
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based
on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment,
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
18. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 11.
12(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which
implies the right of EVERYONE to form and to join trade unions for the protection of
his or her interests.
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